

## NATIONAL ATTITUDES OF ETHNIC HUNGARIANS FROM ROMANIA, SLOVAKIA, SERBIA AND UKRAINE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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**ABSTRACT.** The article comparatively analyses national identifications of Hungarian minorities living in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia (Voivodina) and Ukraine, their ethnic and national attitudes and intergroup relations, including the ethno-national minority – majority relationship, and attitudes towards Hungary and the Roma community. Of interest is the presence and extent of ingroup-outgroup differentiation, and possible cross-national differences and similarities in national attitudes, identity, and perceived social distance. I examined the following two research hypotheses: (1) The Hungarian community in a given country identifies closer with other Hungarian communities living in the diaspora than with Hungarians in Hungary, or the majoritarian population in their country of citizenship. (2) Members of the Hungarian minorities generally perceive a greater social distance in relation to the majority population of a particular country as compared to Hungary’s population, but cross-country differences are likely. The empirical data source of my research is the Karpát Panel survey, first wave (2007), collected on multi-stratified random sample (N=2,915), representing the Hungarian communities in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine, as well as a control sample from Hungary. I used a variety of statistical techniques, including OLS regression and multidimensional scaling – Alscal method based on the average values of social distances towards different ethnic and national communities, as well as other social groups – to analyse the relations of interest.

**Keywords:** minority, attitudes, national identity, interethnic relations

### Introduction

National attitudes are an important part of national identity. People use them for orientation, to place other people in the social space, and they help or hinder us to create “custom made” cognitive assessments during our orientation

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in the social space. Our image of national groups is conveyed by culture and national ideologies. These are confronted with everyday experiences which enforce, weaken or modulate our image of national groups.

This paper relies on the concepts of auto and hetero-stereotyping as auxiliary elements of national attitudes to examine national identification of Hungarian minorities living in four countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE): Romania, Slovakia, Serbia (Voivodina) and Ukraine. For each country, I consider intergroup relations – that is, how Hungarian minoritarians view Hungarian minorities in other countries than their own. At the same time, I analyse their perceptions of (a) the majoritarian population, (b) Hungarians in Hungary – the “kin state,” and (c) Roma, a minority present in all the included countries.

In CEE, the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918 left a part of the population which identified with Hungarian ethnonationality outside Hungary, to form a national minority in the new countries. According to recent census data, the largest Hungarian minority population is to be found in Romania (1,32 million), followed by Slovakia (458 thousand), Serbia (290 thousand) and Ukraine (151 thousand)<sup>2</sup> (see also Papp-Veres, 2007).

The Hungarian government, after the political regime change in 1989, has assumed a so-called “National policy,” which calls for the Hungarian state to elaborate a strategy for improving the situation of Hungarians living outside Hungary, to help them maintain their Hungarian identity and culture. Along this line, the Hungarian Constitution stipulates: “The Hungarian state feels responsible for Hungarians living outside its borders” (Art 6(3)). This “responsibility” is guided by ethnocultural national ideology, and the so-called “Status Law” (2001) has been adopted in its spirit. This law provided for the issuance of so called “Hungarian card” for foreign citizens who claim Hungarian as mother tongue, or who consider themselves part of the Hungarian cultural community. The “problem” of Hungarians living outside the borders has persisted in Hungary. Right-wing organizations have urged the Hungarian state to offer Hungarian citizenship to all persons living abroad who consider themselves Hungarian even if they do not intend to move to Hungary (i.e. double citizenship). The 2004 referendum on this proposal did not meet validity requirements, due to low voting turnout. *Yes* and *no* votes were approximately equally split. The results produced great consternation among Hungarians in the diaspora (Culic 2006:175-200).

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<sup>2</sup> Systematic processings have not been published yet, but the preliminary results of the 2011 census from Romania are accessible on the web-page of the National Institute of Statistics, see [www.recensamant.ro](http://www.recensamant.ro) [May 2013]. For details related to the Slovakian census see Gyurgyik, 2006, Balogová, B.: *Census: Fewer Hungarians, Catholics – and Slovaks*, The Slovak Spectator 5 Mar 2012.

These historical processes show that the issue of Hungarian minority in Hungary's neighbouring countries is of great concern in Hungary, generating important policy debates, and sometimes diplomatic tensions between these countries. Thus, the empirical analysis of the Hungarian minority identity and their relationship with Hungary is of real interest.

### **Theoretical Considerations and Research Hypotheses**

Gellner (1987) differentiates between two types of nation-building forms proceeding from the relationship between social structure and culture. The first one is the “ethnocultural nation”, formed in a stiff, yet complex, extended and well-stratified society based on a farming, autarchic (self-sufficient), and food-producing community. Above them, there is a governing elite, which—in alliance with the ecclesiastical elite—monopolizes communication channels and the institutional instruments of using force; social mobility is not characteristic. The other type of nation is based on citizenship (civic nation), which is formed in a society based on more developed technology than the former one and with a complex and refined division of labour. Social processes are characterized by social mobility (even for those working in agriculture), and general education becomes generalized relatively early (Gellner, 1987). In practice, A. D. Smith also states, these models emerged in combination, but the dominant characteristics of one or the other variant may be traced within the different nation-building processes (Smith, 1991) National identity based on citizenship is primarily characteristic to Western Europe. Ethno-cultural consciousness as defined by Gellner is dominant in Eastern and Central Europe.

I define *national identity* as the stock of knowledge and attitudes composed of affective and cognitive elements and formed collectively, which is the result of the social functioning of national ideology. It represents one of the most important forms of attachment of modern social groups. I analyse the simple form of national identity, so-called “natural national identity” present in the entire society. The “natural national identity” – formulated by Csepeli – is a manifestation of the social communication of the national ideology, when people in their everyday life identify with certain elements of national ideology. In this way, they distinguish the ingroup designated by the national category, they share the symbolic universe created by the national name, fatherland, meanings of national symbols” (Csepeli, 1997:108). National consciousness and national ideology are coexisting phenomena, but not entirely the same; we are dealing with a dual phenomenon in Hobsbawm’s formulation, considering that knowledge of the content of official national ideologies does not supplement the national consciousness of average people in everyday life (Hobsbawm, 1990:10-12).

Stereotyping one's own group and other reference groups is a dimension of collective identity. Usually, the stereotypical image of one's group is positive, whereas that of other groups is positive or negative to a variable degree. According to Le Vine and Campbell (1972), national and ethnic groups form a positive picture about themselves based on certain fundamental personal features, and this is called autostereotype. If there is a conflict or some kind of tension between one's own group and another reference group, the other group is likely to be vested with negative characteristics and antipathy. This is called general heterostereotype, which refers to certain fundamental personal, moral, and motivational features. The affective attitudes towards different reference groups are analysed in this article.

As for the relationship between ethnocultural groups, I do not consider that using hetero-stereotypes is harmful, or that ethnocentrism should eliminate cosmopolitanism. I agree with Calhoun who suggested that „culture and social relationships are as real as individuals, even if they lack bodies”, and criticized the “extreme cosmopolitanism” that promotes the elimination of all loyalties lesser than that of each individual to humanity as a whole (Calhoun, 2003: 531-553).

In this paper I also analyse Hungarian minoritarins' attitudes towards the Roma. The definitions of Roma minorities were discussed, among others, by Troc (2012) in one of his recent writings, where he differentiates a definition from a „majority” view (Troc, 2012: 79). This approach was prevalent in the ways Hungarians living in all countries defined the Roma. Namely, they focused on particular communities and conceived Roma ethnicity as being specific to indigenous or allogeneic groups that were historically and structurally marginalized by majority ethnic/national groups and who developed in response reactive identities and culture/cultures (Williams, 1984; Stewart, 1997).

In Romania and Slovakia (the countries with the largest share of Roma minority), but also in Serbia and Ukraine, the identity and group dynamics specific to the Roma minority significantly differ from the Hungarian minority not only because of the lack of a determined external „kin state” as Hungary in the case of Hungarians, but also because they can be politically mobilised in a completely different way. Although there are Roma social and political organisations, these are not successful in taking action in a uniform way or in ideologically or politically mobilising the majority of the Roma community. Consequently, the influence of the Roma elite on their own community is also weak and fragmented, as opposed to the Hungarian minority.

The characteristics of the ethnocultural national identity are still predominant in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and I will analyse how it functions in intergroup attitudes, in Hungarian minority cases. As Brubaker said, in the case of Central and Eastern European national minorities, the ideological field, which shapes national identities, has three main sources: the so-called “kin

states” undertaking cultural protection, the national ideologies of majority states, and the ideological elements formulated by the leading elite of a national minority. These are only valid if there is a well-defined ethnocultural majority in a given state (Brubaker, 1996: 60-69).

In line with Brubaker, I do not interpret nation as a real entity, community or substantial and stable collective, but rather as an imagined community as defined by Anderson (1991). Instead of answering the question „what is nation?”, I am rather searching for an answer to the question „how is the idea of nation institutionalised as political and cultural form within the state and between states, respectively?”

Another question refers to when and due to which factors the manifestations of national identity are transformed into nationalism. According to Brubaker, nationalism is not induced through „nation”, but through particular manifestations of the political sphere (Brubaker, 1996: 13-17). Verdery points out that all this might happen in the cultural or political sphere as well. According to Verdery’s definition, „nationalism is using the symbolic content of nation in an emotionally exalted form for political reasons” (Verdery, 1993: 77-95). Yet, in parallel with this political use, nationalism results in national ideological discourses that also hold an influence on other spheres of life. In as much as these are reflected in the national identity of individuals, we may talk about national identity loaded with nationalistic or ethnocentric elements. Thus, in our research, we investigate why Hungarian minority populations display more ethnocentric elements in their identities and social attitudes.

Ethno-cultural consciousness may transform into civic national consciousness. This was pointed out by Kuzio (2002), listing the conditions which strengthen it: domestic democratic consolidation, building of local civic institutions, positive influence of international institutions, and when the core ethnic group is self-confident within its own bounded territory (Kuzio, 2002). The question is if these function in minority situations and in what ways, which national consciousness is transformed so as to show civic characteristics.

Previous papers on the national identity of Hungarian minorities, especially in the case of the more numerous Hungarian populations from Romania and Slovakia, have shown that the members of these minority groups do not identify themselves, emotionally and symbolically, with the Romanian or Slovakian majority of their respective countries, while being a Hungarian has a strong positive content (pride, symbols, ethnocentrism) (See Culic, 1999; Csepeli-Örkény-Székelyi, 2000; Veres, 2005). In 1999 Culic pointed out that the identity of minority persons presupposes a complex, double sense of belonging: a formal, legal one, which is prescribed by citizenship, and a cultural, emotional bond through which they are attached to another ethno-cultural nation whose formation is linked to another state. This duality entails duality at the level of group loyalties, human relationships, attitudes and opinions as well (Culic, 1999: 37).

Based on H. Tajfel's studies, we know that a positive social identity has an important role in the survival of a minority community without being culturally assimilated (Tajfel, 1978). My previous research has already confirmed that Hungarians have a positive self-image and the feeling of national pride is high, on average, among Hungarians living in minority, especially in Transylvania (Veres, 2000; 2005; 2010)

In this analysis I will not discuss the entire minority Hungarian identity, but I will highlight and analyse one aspect, using a comparative method. I focus on the functioning – as defined by Barth (1969) – of group identity boundaries specific to Hungarian minority communities from each country and region under the category of ethnoculturally based, transfrontier „imagined” (Anderson, 1991) Hungarian nation and on its social-demographic characteristics.

The question of interest is “how do people belonging to the Hungarian minorities in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine, respectively, relate to and differ from Hungarians in the diaspora and from the majoritarian population of their respective countries when interethnic attitudes that imply social distance are considered?”; Are there any similar patterns? The corresponding research hypotheses are:

First, the Hungarian community in a given country identifies closer with other Hungarian communities living in the diaspora than with Hungarians in Hungary, or the majoritarian population in their country of citizenship. Second, Hungarian minoritarians generally perceive a greater social distance in relation to the majority population in their country of citizenship than to Hungarians in Hungary, but country-differences can be expected due to historical reasons.

## Data and Methods

The empirical data source of my research is the project Karpát Panel, wave 2007.<sup>3</sup> In 2007, a multi-stratified random sample composed of 2,930 persons was selected from Hungarian communities living in five countries (valid N = 2,915): 900 cases in Romania (Transylvania region), 585 cases in Slovakia, 380 cases in Serbia (Vojvodina), 350 cases from Ukraine (Transcarpathia region), and 700 cases in Hungary, as a control sample.

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<sup>3</sup> The institutions coordinating this research project are the following: Minority Research Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA NKI, Hungary) and the Max Weber Foundation for Social Research, Cluj-Napoca (Romania) Partners: Babes-Bolyai University Cluj, Dept. Sociology (Ro), Forum Institute (Slovakia), T. Lehotczky Institute (Zacarpátija, Ukraine), Research coordinators: Attila Papp, Valér Veres, director: László Szarka. The survey was financed by Hungarian Academy for Sciences and the research was supported by Bolyai János scholarship (2008-2010). The next Karpát Panel wave took place in 2010, but only in Romania.

Respondents were selected if they spoke Hungarian. The questionnaire also had questions on national/ethnic self-identification. We asked respondents to indicate, in order, the communities they felt they belonged to, and we processed the first mentioned answers. The main features of so called “natural national identity” (Csepeli, 1997) of ethnic Hungarians from Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine and Serbia was presented in Veres (2010).

To measure ingroup-outgroup, I use the following questionnaire items:

1. In your opinion, the Hungarians from Hungary have other personal features than the Hungarians from the minority from Romania/Slovakia/Serbia/Ukraine?
2. In your opinion, the majority community (Romanian/Slovakian/Serbian/Ukrainian) have other characteristics than the Hungarian minority (from Romania/Slovakia/Serbia/Ukraine)?

I use a five-level scale of attitudes of like/dislike towards specific groups to capture the distance between the Hungarian minority and other social groups. The question was: *How do you see the following groups?* Answer-options ranged from 1 to 5, where 1=very agreeable, 2=rather agreeable, 3=neutral (neither agreeable, nor disagreeable), 4=rather disagreeable, and 5=very disagreeable (the largest distance). I examine these attitudes also by respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics: gender, type of settlement, age, educational level, and language of instruction in school.

Interethnic relations (i.e. perceived interethnic conflict and cooperation) were measured by question: *How is the relationship between the Hungarian minority and the majority (Romanians etc) in country/local level?* The answer-options were the following: 1= conflict, 2=neutral, 3=cooperation. For some of the analyses, I have collapsed these three categories into a dummy variable for conflict, where conflict=1, else=0.

The analysis has involved various statistical techniques, including OLS regression and multidimensional scaling. In the regression analysis, the dependent variable has been the 5-point scale of attitudes towards the majoritarian population. The independent variables has been: age, dummies for gender (men=1), settlement type (urban=1), education (tertiary education and high school=1, lower=0), Hungarian as instruction language (in high school or last level of completed schooling Hungarian =1, else =0) ethnocentrism, perception of conflict relations with the majoritarian population country-wide (conflict=1), interethnic relations on local level (conflict=1), and perceived ethnic discrimination (if respondents experienced ethnic discrimination because of their ethnonationality = 1, else =0).

I constructed the measure of ethnocentrism with Principal Component Analysis using the set of items listed below. Respondents were asked whether the following statements are valid for Hungarians, and “yes” answers were coded with “1”.

1. There is no other nation which has given so many scientists and artists to the world.

2. It is amazing to see how solidary this nation is in times of danger.

3. This nation suffered a lot during history, yet it was able to maintain its identity.


4. This nation has always been the front-line fighter of civilization in Europe.

Regarding multidimensional scaling, I have used the Alscal method to create two-dimensional models based on the average values of attitudes towards different ethnic and national minorities, as well as other social groups, in order to reveal the differences between attitude structures in the countries analysed.

## Results


### *Perceived ingroup boundaries*

In each of the analysed countries, the majority of respondents consider that members of their Hungarian minority group have different personal characteristics than Hungarians from Hungary, whereas 34.6% of Hungarians from Slovakia, 25.5% of Hungarians from Vojvodina, and 21.9% of Hungarians from Transcarpathia and Transylvania consider that these characteristics are the same. Hence, one can notice that Hungarians in the diaspora represent themselves as a distinct group from Hungarians living in Hungary. For the latter, the reverse holds: 51.1% do not see a difference in terms of personal characteristics between themselves and Hungarians in the diaspora, whereas 41.5% consider that the two groups are different (see Fig. 1).



**Fig. 1. In your opinion, the Hungarians from Hungary have other characteristics than the Hungarians from the minority from Romania/Slovakia/Serbia/Ukraine?**

\* In the case of Hungary, the question referred to the Transylvanian Hungarians.



**Fig. 2. In your opinion, the majority community (Romanian/Slovakian/Serbian/Ukrainian) have other personal characteristics than the Hungarian minority (from Romania/Slovakia/Serbia/Ukraine)?**

The results are similar when members of the Hungarian minority reflect on the personal characteristics of the majoritarian population in their country of citizenship. Generally, the proportion of “yes” answers is greater when the reference is group the majoritarian population, than when it is Hungarians in Hungary. Transylvania is the exception (see Fig. 2).

### ***Social attitudes and social distance***

Table 1 reports averages values on a 5-points scale that measures social distance from different groups, including ethnic ones (where 1=smallest distance and 5=greatest distance). For one’s own group, the averages are below 2; for Hungarians from Hungary, averages vary between 2.6 and 2.4, whereas Hungarian minority respondents’ attitudes towards majority groups have averages between 2.5 to 2.7. This indicates a rather neutral stance. Again, when we look at the Transylvania region in Romania, there is basically no difference in how ethnic Hungarians evaluate ethnic Romanians (mean=2.5), and how they evaluate Hungarians from Hungary (mean=2.4). The largest and statistically significant difference occurs in Slovakia, where the mean value for Hungarians from Hungary is 2.0, whereas the mean value for ethnic Slovaks is 2.7.

The case of Slovakia, as compared to Romania, is also noteworthy as it shows a change from earlier studies. Analyses on the 1997 Karpát Research, Csepeli, Örkény and Székelyi (2000: 45, 78) found the social distance between the Hungarian minority and the majority in Slovakia to be lower than for Romania (Csepeli, Örkény, and Székelyi 2000: 78).

**Table 1.****Ethnic Hungarians' Attitudes towards Different Social and Ethno-national Groups, Mean Values, by Countries**

	Hungarian community from:					
	Hungary	Romania	Ukraine	Slovakia	Serbia	Total
Majority nation (Ro, Ukr, Sk, Sb)		2.51	2.59	2.71	2.61	2.59
Hungarians (Hu)	1.99	2.39	2.37	2.01	2.37	2.20
Roma	3.25	3.17	3.46	3.53	3.13	3.29
Jews	2.84	2.90	2.95	2.99	2.88	2.91
Germans	2.71	2.69	2.92	2.88	2.61	2.76
Chinese	3.18	2.97	3.08	3.14	2.98	3.08
Transylvanian (RO) Hungarians	2.29	1.80	2.34	2.06	2.20	2.09
Serbian Hungarians	2.37	2.20	2.42	2.13	1.84	2.20
Slovakian Hungarians	2.40	2.22	2.38	1.83	2.26	2.21
Ukrainian Hungarians	2.41	2.21	1.72	2.08	2.27	2.18
Unemployed people	2.76	2.89	2.91	3.02	2.76	2.87
Asylum seekers	3.00	2.70	3.01	3.07	3.49	3.00
Homosexuals	3.76	4.16	4.29	3.85	3.95	3.99
Skinheads	4.16	4.28	4.43	4.40	4.24	4.28
Drug addicts	4.24	4.45	4.64	4.38	4.41	4.40
Entrepreneurs	2.82	2.87	2.79	2.85	2.79	2.84
New rich	3.41	3.26	3.23	3.53	3.58	3.39
Security guards	2.76	2.82	2.82	2.97	2.93	2.85

**Note:** The question was: *How do you see the following groups?* The answer-options ranged on a scale from 1 to 5, with the following coding: 1=very agreeable, 2=rather agreeable, 3=neutral (neither agreeable, nor disagreeable), 4=rather disagreeable, and 5=very disagreeable (the largest distance).

Table 1 consistently shows that Hungarians in the diaspora feel closest to people like themselves, that is, other Hungarians living outside Hungary. They form a separate group, distinguishable from both Hungarians in Hungary, and from the majoritarian population. A significant part of respondents also declared to be members of the national majority (Veres, 2010). From a social-psychological perspective these results may be interpreted in the sense that Hungarian regional membership has a stronger normative and cohesive power than Hungarian statehood, or citizenship of the country where the Hungarian minority lives.

**Table 2.**

**Ethnic Hungarians' Attitudes towards Majoritarian Populations, Hungarians from Hungary, and the Roma: Mean Values by Socio-Demographic Variables and Countries**

	Romania			Slovakia		
Gender	Romanians	Hungarians from Hungary	Roma	Slovakians	Hungarians from Hungary	Roma
Men	2.53	2.43	3.22	2.80**	2.13	3.53
Women	2.49	2.33	3.12	2.63**	1.91	3.53
<b>Settlement type</b>						
Rural	2.52	2.30**	3.08*	2.73	2.04	3.52*
Urban	2.50	2.46**	3.26*	2.65	1.97	3.73*
<b>Age groups</b>						
18-29	2.60*	2.44*	3.39**	2.86**	2.08*	3.58*
30-44	2.64*	2.54*	3.20	2.72	2.10	3.72
45-64	2.46	2.33	3.06	2.72	1.94	3.54
65 and over	2.45*	2.28*	3.15**	2.60**	1.99*	3.32*
<b>Education level</b>						
Elementary	2.47	2.28*	3.06	2.65	1.93	3.33
Vocational	2.64	2.58	3.22	2.74	2.02	3.55
High school and post-secondary	2.49	2.33	3.31	2.74	2.03	3.66
University	2.52	2.54*	3.20	2.65	2.20	3.58
<b>Language of instruction in secondary school</b>						
Hungarian	2.55	2.31**	3.17	2.77	1.99	3.48
Majority (Ro, Sk, etc)	2.46	2.48**	3.16	2.65	2.08	3.60
<b>Total</b>	<b>2.51</b>	<b>2.40</b>	<b>3.17</b>	<b>2.71</b>	<b>2.01</b>	<b>3.53</b>

**Note:** The question was: *How do you see the following groups?* The answer-options ranged on a scale from 1 to 5, with the following coding: 1=very agreeable, 2=rather agreeable, 3=neutral (neither agreeable, nor disagreeable), 4=rather disagreeable, and 5=very disagreeable (the largest distance).

\* p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01 level significant differences between mean values (t-test).

Continuation of Table 2

Gender	Ukraine			Serbia		
	Ukrainians	Hungarians from Hungary	Roma	Serbs	Hungarians from Hungary	Roma
Men	2.54	2.33	3.45	2.54	2.34	3.10
Women	2.63	2.39	3.47	2.67	2.38	3.15
<b>Settlement type</b>						
Rural	2.62	2.36	3.49	2.66	2.27	3.12
Urban	2.46	2.39	3.34	2.50	2.48	3.12
<b>Age groups</b>						
18-29	2.51*	2.61*	3.52	2.74*	2.52*	3.20
30-44	2.54	2.35	3.35	2.56	2.39	3.05
45-64	2.56	2.20	3.49	2.64	2.36	3.18
65 and over	2.77*	2.39*	3.45	2.50*	2.20*	3.02
<b>Education level</b>						
Elementary	2.70*	2.37	3.35	2.69	2.36*	3.13
Vocational	2.38	2.12	3.40	2.53	2.19	3.00
High school and post- secondary	2.56	2.40	3.54	2.67	2.51	3.25
University	2.40*	2.39	3.55	2.55	2.53*	3.13
<b>Language of instruction in secondary school</b>						
Hungarian	2.70**	2.43	3.50	2.74**	2.42*	3.18
Majority (Ro, Sk, etc)	2.33**	2.24	3.44	2.17**	2.17*	3.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>2.59</b>	<b>2.37</b>	<b>3.46</b>	<b>2.61</b>	<b>2.37</b>	<b>3.13</b>

**Note:** The question was: *How do you see the following groups?* The answer-options ranged on a scale from 1 to 5, with the following coding: 1=very agreeable, 2=rather agreeable, 3=neutral (neither agreeable, nor disagreeable), 4=rather disagreeable, and 5=very disagreeable (the largest distance).

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$  level significant differences between mean values (t-test) For age groups and education level variables I compared the first and last categories.

Table 2 presents, for Hungarians living in Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine and Serbia respectively, mean values of attitudes towards the national majority, Hungarians from Hungary, and the Roma, along selected socio-demographic variables: sex, type of settlement, age group, level of education, and the language of teaching in primary school. The one result that clearly stands out pertains to attitudes toward Roma. For all countries and irrespective of socio-demographic

background, ethnic Hungarians dislike the Roma. There are some nuances, for example by settlement type and age groups in Romania and Slovakia. Mean scores are higher for the youngest respondents, and for urban dwellers.

Interesting are also mean differences by language of instruction for attitudes towards the majoritarian population. Only in Ukraine and Serbia respondents whose language of instruction in secondary school was Hungarian report, on average, higher dislike of the majoritarian population than those taught in the language of the national majority. For Romania and Slovakia, this is not the case. Yet for Romania one can notice a significant difference in mean appraisal of Hungarians from Hungary.

Finally, there are some significant mean differences by education levels: in Romania and in Serbia, ethnic Hungarians with elementary education only have more positive attitudes towards Hungarians from Hungary than university-educated respondents. In the interpretation field created by the ideal of cultural unity, it is possible to imagine that intellectuals are disappointed with the extent to which the Hungarians in Hungary have lived up to the state-proclaimed responsibility towards Hungarians living outside its borders (see Culic, 2006). This relation needs further investigation, especially given that in the other two countries no significant differences have been found.

### ***Perceptions of Interethnic Conflict and Cooperation***

Table 3 and 4 show how members of the Hungarian minority perceive their group's relation with the majoritarian population nationwide (Table 3), and at the level of their locality of residence (Table 4). On national level, Slovakia is the only country where a majority (55%) describes Slovakian-Hungarian interethnic relations as conflictual. For Serbia, the corresponding value is 38.9%, for Romania 36.4% and for Ukraine, 14.6%. At the opposite pole, roughly 35% of ethnic Hungarians in Romania and in Ukraine report interethnic relations of cooperation. In Serbia, this percentage is 21%, and in Slovakia 16.6%.

Contextualising the results for Romania, respondents' answers likely reflect the political nature of the relations between the Hungarian minority and majoritarian population: at the time of the data were collection (2007), the political party representing the Hungarian minority (Uniunea Democrată a Maghiarilor din România - UDMR, the Democratic Union of Hungarians from Romania) was part of the ruling coalition. It is very likely that UDMR's participation in government was related to Hungarians' perceptions of interethnic relations.

In contrast to perceived interethnic relations nationwide, when respondents reflect upon their interactions with the majoritarian population in their places of residence, a more positive picture emerges. The percentage of respondents reporting relations of cooperation with the national majority in their locality is 55% or higher in all countries except Serbia.

**Table 3.**

**Perceived interethnic relations between the Hungarian minority  
and the national majority on country level (%)**

Countries	Interethnic relationship on country level**			N (100%)
	Conflictual	Cooperative	Neutral	
Romania	36.4%	35.8%	27.7%	815
Ukraine	14.6%	35.0%	50.5%	309
Slovakia	55.8%	16.6%	27.7%	477
Serbia	38.9%	21.9%	39.2%	334
<b>Total</b>	<b>38.1%</b>	<b>28.5%</b>	<b>33.3%</b>	<b>1935</b>

\*\* Association is significant at  $p < 0.01$  level (Chi-square)

**Table 4.**

**Perceived interethnic relations between the Hungarian minority  
and the national majority in the locality (%)**

Countries	Interethnic relationship in the locality**			Total (%)	N
	Conflictual	Cooperative	Neutral		
Romania	8.7%	70.1%	21.1%	100%	814
Ukraine	4.3%	61.4%	34.3%	100%	303
Slovakia	10.8%	55.0%	34.2%	100%	529
Serbia	18.1%	45.6%	36.3%	100%	353
<b>Total</b>	<b>20.2%</b>	<b>51.1%</b>	<b>28.7%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>2643</b>

\*\* Association is significant at  $p < 0.01$  level (Chi-square)

Next, I regroup answers to the perception of interethnic relations question into conflictual (1) and non-conflictual (0). I use t-test to assess if there are significant differences between these two groups with regard to mean values of attitudes of liking/disliking toward: (a) the majoritarian population; (b) Hungarians from Hungary; and (c) the Roma. It is worth reminding that the attitude variable ranges from 1 to 5 (see Data and Methods). I do these analyses for perceptions of conflictual interethnic relations at the national (Table 5) and at the local level (available upon request). As expected, those who perceive conflictual relations with the majoritarian population also have greater dislike of it, irrespective of country. Generally this holds for both the national and the local levels. Exception is Slovakia, where at the level of localities the difference in means between groups is not significant.

Table 5.

**Ethnic Hungarians' attitudes (mean values) towards selected reference groups, by perception of conflictual/non-conflictual relations with the majoritarian population nationwide**

Attitudes towards:		Romania	Slovakia	Ukraine	Serbia
Hungarians in diaspora	Non-conflictual	1.80	1.93**	1.71	1.89
	Conflictual	1.80	1.73**	1.84	1.75
Majoritarian population (Romanian/ Slovakian/ Ukrainian/ Serb)	Non-conflictual	2.40**	2.64*	2.55**	2.37**
	Conflictual	2.74**	2.78*	2.84**	3.10**
Hungarians from Hungary	Non-conflictual	2.34	2.11*	2.38	2.31
	Conflictual	2.44	1.89*	2.25	2.47
Roma minority	Non-conflictual	3.11*	3.42**	3.44	2.94**
	Conflictual	3.28*	3.65**	3.60	3.47**

\*\* The difference is significant at  $p < 0.01$  level (t -test)

The next step in my analyses is OLS regression of the 5-point scale of attitudes toward the majoritarian population (1=very agreeable, 5=very disagreeable) on respondents' socio-demographic characteristics, their degree of ethnocentrism, perception of conflictual relations with the majoritarian population, and perceived ethnic discrimination. Table 6 reports the standardized coefficients for the analyses performed by country.

Among respondents' socio-demographic characteristics, age and Hungarian as language of instruction in school matter in three of the four countries. *Ceteris paribus*, increase in age significantly lowers attitudes of dislike in Romania and Slovakia, but works the opposite way in Ukraine. Hungarian language of instruction significantly increases dislike in Slovakia, Ukraine and Serbia, net of other factors. Significant gender effects are present for Slovakia only. Serbia is the only country where the effect of urban dwelling is significant: compared to non-urban, ethnic Hungarians living in cities dislike ethnic Serbs less, other factors controlled for.

Independently of respondents' socio-demographics, ethnocentrism significantly increases dislike of the majoritarian population in all four countries. Its effect is also strong relative to the other variables. Perceived conflictual relations with the majoritarian population country-wide increases dislike of it in both Romania and Ukraine. In Romania, Slovakia and Serbia, Hungarians who felt discriminated against based on their ethnicity, compared to those who did not, display stronger dislike of the majoritarian population.

Finally, perceptions of conflictual interethnic relations at local level are significant only for Serbia, probably due to Serbian immigrants fleeing from the South because of the Yugoslavian wars. I checked the correlation coefficients between interethnic conflict country-wide and interethnic conflict at local level, and we can see significant ( $p < 0.01$ ) but weak relations ( $r = 0.249$  for Romania; 0.154 for Slovakia; 0.249 for Ukraine; 0.321 for Serbia).

**Table 6.**

**OLS regression of ethnic Hungarians' attitudes toward the majoritarian population on selected independent variables, by countries**

Independent variables:	Beta coefficients			
	Romania	Slovakia	Ukraine	Serbia
Age	-0.125***	-0.102*	0.118*	-0.010
Gender (Men=1)	0.019	0.107*	-0.052	-0.075
Urban (1, else =0)	-0.032	-0.058	-0.082	-0.156***
University or college <sup>a</sup>	-0.029	-0.030	-0.013	0.027
High school <sup>a</sup>	-0.064	0.018	-0.016	0.004
Language of instruction in school(Hungarian =1)	0.062	0.083*	0.139**	0.113**
Ethnocentrism	0.198***	0.181***	0.182***	0.235***
Perceived interethnic relations on country level (conflictual=1, else=0)	0.165***	0.027	0.106*	0.131**
Perceived interethnic relations on local level (conflictual=1)	-0.002	-0.010	0.083	0.257***
Perceived discrimination	0.147***	0.162***	0.065	0.131***
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.112	0.080	0.100	0.274
N	870	517	335	368

<sup>a</sup> This educational group is contrasted to those with lower level of education

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$

### ***Multidimensional Scaling Model of the attitudes toward social groups***

I used Multidimensional Scaling, with Alscal method in SPSS, computing two-dimensional models for the four countries. The social attitudes of Hungarian minorities measure social distances towards the following national, ethnic and other social minority groups: national majorities (Romanians, Slovaks, Serbs, Ukrainians), Hungarian minorities, Hungarians from Hungary, Roma minority, other ethnic groups (Jews, Chinese, Germans, Asylum seekers) non-ethnic social minorities (homosexuals, security guards, entrepreneurs, unemployed, drug addicts, and skinheads). For all models, the S-stress values are less than 0.10:

for Romania 0.06, for Slovakia and Ukraine 0.05, and for Serbia, 0.10. (see Table 8). The goodness of fit can be assessed by examining the scatterplots by countries (see Appendix 1).


**Table 8.**

**Multidimensional Scaling Model Summary of Group Attitudes  
(Alscal method, bidimensional) by countries, cases and  
S-stress significance levels**

Country	Valid N	S-stress <sup>a</sup>	RSQ value
Romania	473	0.060	0.980
Slovakia	446	0.047	0.990
Ukraine	282	0.049	0.991
Serbia	282	0.100	0.953


<sup>a</sup> Euclidean Distance used

Analysing the Derived Stimulus Configuration of the two-dimensional MDS model of Hungarians living in Romania (Fig. 3), we may see that the level of agreeability -antipathy towards different groups appears along the vertical dimension. The unemployed and the own group, Hungarians from Transylvania, are placed on the top, while Roma, the new rich and entrepreneurs are at the bottom. The other dimension embodies continuum from social non-ethnic groups (drug addicts, skinheads, homosexuals), that may be characterised by strong rejection to Hungarian ethnic minority groups (Hungarians from Slovakia, Serbia, Ukraine) that are largely accepted. If we interpret these two dimensions together, the „own” group, the unemployed, asylum seekers, and other Hungarian ethnic minorities are situated in the first right upper quarter, which is highly accepted according to both dimensions. Germans, together with Jews, Chinese and security guards are around the neutral field; they represent groups to which our respondents are not specifically connected. Hungarians from Hungary, majority Romanians and Entrepreneurs fall into the right bottom quarter. They are considered less agreeable on the vertical axis, but on the horizontal axis they fall very far from the „other” social groups such as drug addicts or homosexuals. It is worth noticing that the two „majority” reference groups have become very close. Both Hungarians from Hungary and Romanians are „majority” national groups to which Hungarians from Romania are linked through some kind of „dependency” and their representation is that of „minority” in relation to both. Therefore, the respondents perceived a similar distance from their minority ingroup and both to Hungarians from Hungary and to Romanians. This is so even under the conditions in which 80% of Romanian respondents agree that Hungarians from Transylvania are part of the Hungarian nation, and 65% also agree that Hungarians from Romania are part of the Romanian nation (Veres, 2010:146-149). It may be argued that in the first case we have to deal with cultural identification, while in the second case with civic identification (Veres, 2012)




**Fig. 3. Multidimensional Scaling Model, social group attitudes of Hungarians from Romania (Alsocal method, two-dimensional solution)**

The model of Hungarians from Slovakia is somewhat similar, yet with some noticeable differences (see Fig. 4.): Hungarian ethnic minorities are situated in the right upper quarter but there are no other social groups nearby. Hungarians from Hungary and majority Slovaks fall into the right bottom quarter, but in such a way that Hungarians from Hungary are situated close to Hungarian minorities, including the „own” group. In this model, they are situated farther from majority Slovaks than in the case of the Romanian model. Roma are perceived in a similar way as in the Romanian model, but they are more separated and no other social group is close to them. The new rich are situated at the upper margin of the left bottom quarter and their perception is considerably more positive than in Romania.




**Fig. 4. Multidimensional Scaling Model of social group attitudes of Hungarians from Slovakia (Alscal method, two-dimensional solution)**

The model for Hungarians in Ukraine is different from the Romanian model (Fig. 5). According to this model, Hungarians from Hungary are situated in the right upper quarter of the map and majority Serbians near them. Hungarian ethnic minorities are situated in the right bottom quarter of the map, while entrepreneurs and the unemployed fell near the axis of the model, the „neutral” zone. The Roma and the new rich are situated in the left upper quarter of the model. Although they are far from the own group (Hung\_Uk) it is as if the vertical axis has turned around compared to the Romanian and Slovakian models. Otherwise, „majority” national groups, Hungarians from Hungary and Ukrainians are situated close here as well. On the other hand, similarly to the Romanian model too, Hungarian ethnic minorities stand apart quite clearly. Based on attitudes towards drug addicts, skinheads and homosexuals, Hungarians from Ukraine are situated farther, in the direction of negative values.




**Fig. 5. Multidimensional Scaling Model, social group attitudes of Hungarians from Ukraine (Alsral method, two-dimensional solution)**

The model from Serbia is exceptionally different (Fig. 6). Different Hungarian ethnic minorities do not form a cluster. Hungarians from Serbia as „own” group are situated at the right margin of the right upper quarter of the map, while Hungarians from Hungary are situated the closest to them. Hungarians from Slovakia falls farther, vertically upwards and to the left at the same time, while Hungarians from Romania and Ukraine appear distinctly in the left upper quarter of the figure, far from both Slovaks and any other group. The most groups do not fall far from Hungarians from Hungary either, but they are situated in the central part of the right bottom quarter. Roma are on their left, but still in the same quarter while entrepreneurs and security guards are situated between the two. Drug users, skinheads and homosexuals fall very far from the own group only according to the horizontal dimension, although they belong to the other left-bottom quarter, but close to the axis.



**Fig. 6. Multidimensional Scaling Model, social group attitudes of Hungarians from Serbia (Alscl method, bidimensional)**

The MDS Derived Subject Weights model, with differences between countries (Fig. 7) confirms a peculiar location of Hungarians from Serbia. While the location of national-ethnic groups of Hungarians from Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine is similar (all situated in the right bottom corner), Hungarians from Serbia are situated very far from them (in the left upper corner).



**Fig. 7. Individual differences by countries in Multidimensional Scaling Model of social group attitudes of Hungarian minorities (Alscal method, 1-Romania, 2-Ukraine, 3-Slovakia, 4-Serbia)**

## Conclusions

The results of this research point out that Hungarians living in minority in different countries form ingroups, in that they feel significantly closer to other Hungarians in the diaspora than to the majoritarian population in their country of citizenship, Hungarians in Hungary, and the Roma. The majority of respondents perceive members of the majoritarian population (Romanians, Slovaks, Ukrainians and Serbs, respectively), as well as Hungarians in Hungary, as having personal characteristics that are different from their own. However, the idea of belonging to the „unitary” Hungarian nation also exists, and it is shared by a large proportion (70-80%) of every minority community (see Veres, 2012:149). Based on the employed bivariate and multivariate statistical methods, we may conclude that certain socio-demographic factors, such as age and Hungarian as language of instruction, are more relevant for shaping ethnic Hungarians’ attitudes of

liking/dislike towards the majoritarian population than education or gender. Of particular importance is ethnocentrism, which significantly increases attitudes of dislike in all four countries, above and beyond respondents' socio-demographic characteristics. My analysis also shows that variables capturing perceptions of conflictual interethnic relations, and of ethnic discrimination, greatly contribute to understanding variation in ethnic Hungarians' attitudes towards the ethnic majoritarians in their countries.

In accordance with Verdery's (1993) approach, the discrepancy between the explanatory model for Serbia and those for the other countries might be attributed to the "loadedness" of ethnicity following the oppressive ethnic policies of the Milosevich regime, the Yugoslav wars and their consequences for the population of Vojvodina. In Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine state policies were more permissive towards the recognized ethnic minorities, thus ethnicity remained less loaded. Except for this difference, the country-models are quite similar.

Hungarians living in minority in various countries do not include themselves in the same ingroup as Hungarians from Hungary, and they do not feel very close to them. According to MDS Alscal models, our respondents' group identity may be illustrated by concentric circles (see Fig. 3). The first circle delineates the attitudes of Hungarians from Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine as similar: the Hungarian minorities from these countries are the closest to the "self-group". The next concentric circle includes the whole Hungarian nation, especially the Hungarians from Hungary. The third concentric circle opens towards the majority nation (and other ethnic minorities, except for Roma, who are placed farther away). The relationship between the Hungarian minority and the majority is closest in Romania; this pattern is also present in Slovakia and Ukraine. In Serbia a distinct model may be noticed: probably due to the social consequences of the Yugoslavian war, Hungarians from Serbia (Vojvodina) perceive Hungarians from Hungary as relatively close.


While this paper provides interesting insights, it also has methodological limitations that stem to a good extent from using cross-sectional data. Research on this topic will greatly benefit from over-time cross-national comparisons of ethnic minorities groups' self-identification, and their relational positioning to relevant reference groups, such as those discussed in this paper. Such approach, which longitudinal data make possible, would allow us to measure change in respondents' characteristics through time, including change in their attitudes. It would also facilitate disentangling possible reciprocal effects, for example between variables like perceptions of interethnic conflict and social distance.

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APPENDIX



**Fig. A1. Scatterpot of liner fits by countries: MDS model (Alscal), attitudes towards different ethnic, national and other social groups, by countries**