MUSLIM IMMIGRATION AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE REDEFINITION OF NATIONHOOD IN GERMANY

KATARZYNA ANDREJUK[1]

ABSTRACT. The objective of my article is to describe how immigration modifies the political vision of nationhood – citizenship – basing on the example of Germany. Since the 1960s, Germany has been a land of immigration for numerous ethnic groups. The economic development and need for blue-collar workers in various sectors of German industry attracted immigrants from poorer countries of Southern Europe and Asia. Many of them came from a Muslim cultural background. The largest group of Muslim immigrants originated from Turkey; other groups included Muslims from regions of former Yugoslavia. They were supposed to stay in Germany only temporarily, and this assumption was mirrored by the name this group was given: "guest workers" (*Gästarbeiters*). However, in spite of the efforts made by the German government, many Muslim immigrants did not return to their countries when the period of economic prosperity was over. A second and third generation of immigrant children was born. Currently, the Turkish diaspora constitutes 80% of German Muslims; their population is estimated at 2.5 - 3 million. This forced a shift in the German policy of citizenship. Before Germany became a country of immigration, it developed an "ethnic" model of citizenship (as opposed to the "civic" French model, as described by Brubaker), which was granted to individuals with German parents (*jus sanguinis*). This strict model was loosened, and citizenship legislation amendment in 2000 enabled the children of Muslim immigrants to acquire German citizenship. After a decade of functioning of the new citizenship model, it has proved to contribute to a conversion from an ethnic to a multicultural and cosmopolitan community. I outline the prevailing divisions in German society: they are no longer based on citizenship, but rather on economic factors: access to employment, housing conditions and education opportunities. I also compare the development of the notions of citizenship and nationhood in Germany to the changes in other European countries, such as France and Sweden, which occurred in the same time.

Keywords: citizenship reform, immigration, Muslim diasporas, Germany

---

[1] Institute of Philosophy and Sociology - PAN, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, e-mail: *katarzyna.andrejuk@gmail.com*.

The mass migration flows to European countries, which occurred in the second half of the 20ᵗʰ century, challenged the vision of a traditional nation-state. This confrontation was especially sharp in countries like Germany, where the notion of nationhood had very strong ethnic connotations. The clash of cultures seemed particularly interesting in case of Muslim immigrants, who personified the most exotic and unknown aspects of "the Other": different religion, style of life, language and cultural tradition far from the European one.

The article has the following order. First I discuss most significant sociological theories concerning current changes in the institution of citizenship and national belonging in the age of migrations. Then I describe the history of Muslim diasporas in Germany. I concentrate on the migration flows in the 1960s and 1970s, because these waves formed the fundaments of today's Muslim communities in Germany. I analyze immigrants' educational achievements and their situation on the labour market, which leads to a conclusion about inheriting the low social and economic status of parents by the second and third generation of Muslims living in the Federal Republic. The main part of the article examines changes of citizenship and immigration law in the 1990s and 2000s. I describe how the changes in the legal framework influenced social activities of Muslim immigrants. Two main questions are posed: whether the citizenship reform can be acknowledged as a success and whether it changed the socio-economic (class) divisions in German society.

Citizenship and participation: overview of sociological approaches

Since the 1990s, even before the German reform of naturalization law, numerous sociologists have analyzed the contemporary global transformations of citizenship regimes on the example of Germany. The Federal Republic forms a fascinating illustration of intricate relationships between laws of naturalization and a nature of a political community. In the public discourse, it had been traditionally perceived as a nationally homogeneous country for many years. Even after the inflow of immigrants in the 1960s it has been publicly stated that "Germany is not a country of immigration" – a formula which has been called a "German self-denial" (Kolb, 2008). The rules of citizenship acquisition constituted an important part of the prevailing vision of the German nation.

As Rogers Brubaker (1990) noticed, in the age of the nation-state, the politics of citizenship has been also a politics of nationhood; in consequence, all debates about citizenship bring down the debates about nationhood. He argued that German idea of citizenship presupposed a political membership which is simultaneously a membership in a cultural community, united by a language, tradition, "national character" and common descent. Originally, the German model of membership in a community presumed that nationhood was

constituted by ethnocultural unity and expressed in a form of political agreement. Brubaker opposed the German vision of nationhood: "particularist, organic, differentialist and *Volk*-centered" to the French concept of nationhood – "universalist, rationalist, assimilationist and state-centered". He linked this specific understanding of nationhood with two phenomena: German Romanticism and Prussian reforms (Otto Bismarck and his politics which led to the unification of German states in the 19th century). However, it was also argued that this model influenced German provisions on citizenship which had been in force since 1913 and had endured until the reforms which amended the law partially in 1990 and then more radically in 2000 (Brubaker, 1990: 5–16; 1992: 3-17). In Brubaker's approach, differences in citizenship practices and policies, observed in various European states, are the result of different visions of nationhood in particular states. This article argues that the abovementioned rule is also applicable to changes in citizenship law of one specific country: the radical amendments of law are the consequence of modifications in defining nationhood.

The institution of a state citizenship is also influenced by the developments on the international level. The changing patterns of community allegiance have been described as postnational citizenship (Soysal, 1995). Postnational citizenship derives its legitimacy from universal human values rather than national belonging. Yasemin Soysal (1997), describing a fundamental modification in the understanding of citizenship, perceives it as a consequence of three processes. First is intensification of transnational discourse and internationalization of human rights within such organizations as United Nations or Council of Europe. Second is the growing recognition of the right of an individual to cultivate his own culture and identity. Third is the partial loss of sovereignty by the nation-states caused by emergence and widening competences of international organizations like the European Union. These new challenges re-shape the traditional institution of citizenship, because "rights that were once associated with belonging in a national community have become increasingly abstract and legitimated at the transnational level, within a larger framework of human rights" (Soysal 1997: 1 – 2). Participation and membership in community life is no longer determined only by the possession of national citizenship; Soysal illustrates it on the example of Muslim immigrants in Germany, stating that members of the Turkish diaspora living in Germany, even without a formal passport of the Federal Republic, make claims on Berlin's authority structures and participate in municipal institutions (Soysal 1997: 1, 6).

Similarly to Soysal, Saskia Sassen (2002) argues that the process of nationalizing citizenship which one observed over the last two centuries, is finished. Yet, partial denationalization of citizenship takes place. A significant aspect of this phenomenon is increasing acceptance to multiple allegiances and dual citizenship. The process of denationalization of citizenship is, *inter alia*, the effect of economic

globalization: states attempt to resolve their conflicts peacefully, avoiding war because of economic pressure from internationally-operating companies, and they no longer need dedicated patriotic soldiers. Citizens' loyalty is less crucial to the state than in the times of warfare (Sassen 2002). In Sassen's approach, the reinvention of citizenship takes place mostly in denationalized spaces such as global multicultural cities with large immigrant populations.

Christian Joppke tried to reconcile the theoretical approaches of Brubaker and Soysal, stating that two fundamental modes of community belonging have been visible in Germany since the 1960s until (at least) the end of 1990s. The first mode, traditional ethnic citizenship, existed only for native Germans, who formed the most exclusive part of the society. The second mode, postnational membership, was available for immigrants as a partial substitution of *Staatsburgerschaft* - full participation in the host society. Joppke characterizes the German reunification (1990) as a breakthrough moment for citizenship regime. The period between 1950 and 1990 was characterized by the most intensive remigration of ethnic Germans from Russia to their homeland. After "demise of ethnic diaspora to redeem", as Joppke argued, there no longer existed a rationale for maintaining the model of ethnic citizenship. The fundamental changes in the perception of citizenship and naturalization appeared thus a long time before the most radical reform of naturalization law in 2000 (Joppke, 1999).

History of Muslims in Germany

Muslims have been present in Germany since the 17th century, when first Turks came as war prisoners. In the Interwar period, Muslims who lived in Germany were mostly students or asylum seekers. The large wave of Muslim immigration started after the World War Two, in the period of economic prosperity (1960). Germany signed international agreements enabling the arrival of labour force (*Gastarbeiter*) from other countries. The agreements were signed i.a. with: Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968) (Nalborczyk 2005). The economic immigration included also substantial inflows from non-Muslim southern European countries, such as Italy, Spain and Greece; their integration in the second or third generation occurred more successful than in the case of Muslim immigrants. *Gastarbeiter* were unqualified immigrants, they were hired for blue collar jobs in the secondary segment of the labor market, often in the heavy industry and building industry. They came mostly from rural areas of their respective countries (for example religious region of Anatolia in Turkey), and they settled in German metropolises: Berlin, Köln, Munich and Hamburg. The clash they experienced was not only a clash between Turkish and German culture, but also between countryside lifestyles and life in European big cities.

The recession in Germany 1973-1974 caused the government to officially finish the guest worker recruitment. The immigrants were encouraged to return to their home countries, e.g. by financial incentives. However, contrary to the political intentions and expectations of the German government, not many immigrants took advantage of this chance; moreover, the immigrants (mostly men) were joined by their families, wives and children. Muslim immigrants were no longer guests; they settled down and developed diasporas. The unexpected consequences of the labour migration were famously summed up by an Austrian writer Max Frisch: "we wanted labour force but people came instead".

Today the Turks are the majority of the Muslim community in Germany. The Turkish diaspora constitutes 80% of German Muslims. Their population is estimated at 2.5 - 3 million and over 1.5 million Turks are treated as foreigners because they are not naturalized (Table 1). Besides, the most numerous Muslim groups are Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Iran, Morocco, Lebanon. Smaller groups include immigrants from Pakistan, Syria, and Tunisia. However, the typical Muslim in Germany is of Turkish descent. This ethnic minority played the most important role in shaping the image of a contemporary German Muslim and influencing the German immigration and citizenship policies.

Table 1.
Foreign-born Muslims in Germany by country of origin

Countries of origin	Number of foreign-born Muslims in Germany
Southeast Europe, of which:	**354,941**
Albania	7,262
Bulgaria	762
Former Yugoslavia	346,917
Turkey	**1,506,410**
Central Asia of which:	**13,126**
Kazakhstan	1,136
Russian Federation	5,826
Rest of CIS	6,163
Iran	32,915
South/Southeast Asia, of which:	**72,715**
Afghanistan	34,885
Bangladesh	3,772
India	1,670
Indonesia/ Malaysia	6,297
Pakistan	26,091

Middle East, of which:	110,363
Egypt	8,414
Iraq	44,248
Israel	746
Yemen/Jordan	9,101
Lebanon	35,314
Saudi Arabia	No data
Syria	12,538
North Africa, of which:	91,597
Morocco	32,609
Rest of North Africa	58,988
Other parts of Africa:	32,341
All countries:	2,214 405

Source: Haug, Mussig, Stichs 2009: 63.

Muslim community in Germany is very fragmented and heterogeneous. The complicated character of the Muslim community is induced not only by different countries of origin of Muslim immigrants, but also by divisions in particular Muslim groups. The largest Muslim diaspora, Turks, is much diversified as well. Majority of the Turks are *Gastarbeiter* and their children (or grandchildren), but there are also asylum seekers, leaving their countries for political reasons. Such group is e.g. Kurds from Turkey (and Iraq). Most of German Muslims are Sunni, which is a main branch of Islam in Turkey and Bosnia. However, there are also groups of Alevi Muslims, who are liberal and prone to the integration processes, easily accepting cultural values of Western societies. Besides, there are groups of the most conservative branch, Shia Muslims, who emigrate mostly from Iran. In consequence, the tie that binds Muslim communities in Germany, is the public image of Muslims. What is common for different members of the Muslim group, is that they are all perceived as "Ausländer", foreigners and strangers.

Muslims in education and on the labour market
Muslims in Germany stem from poor backgrounds, as the first generation of immigrants were usually uneducated blue-collar workers. This low social status is often inherited by second and also third generation. Currently ethnic divisions in Germany overlap with class divisions. Descendants of immigrants from African or Asian countries (counting Turkey as a part of Asia) are less educated than ethnic Germans and their situation on the labour market is worse – in terms of wages, positions and unemployment rate.

Exclusion begins in the educational institutions. Results of PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) show that immigrant pupils' achievements are significantly lower (compared to natives) in key school subjects such as mathematics, reading and science. In many cases it is a consequence of poor knowledge of the language of instruction, because in cases of some minorities (e.g. Turks) children of immigrants do not speak German at home (OECD, 2003). Immigrants in Germany generally tend to have lower education than natives. However, the disparities between average level of education are especially significant when we compare native Germans and Turkish immigrants. The number of ethnic Turks born in Germany (second or third generation) who passed the *Abitur* – High School Final Exam – is 50% lower than the average figure reported for native Germans. This difference exists in spite of the fact that second and third generation is generally better educated than the Turks who came from their home country in the 60 and 70 (those born in Germany have *Abitur* twice as often as the first generation immigrants) (Woellert, Kröhnert, Klingholz 2009).

German official statistical data on employment does not distinguish between different religious backgrounds; neither does it provide the information on nationality of ethnic affiliation of the explored population. However, it is estimated that unemployment rate among immigrants and immigrant descendants is about twice as high as for the whole population. Groups especially endangered with unemployment are those of Turkish, Serbian and Russian descent (Woellert, Kröhnert, Klingholz 2009). In some federal states the unemployment among young Muslims during the difficult period in the labor market increased to about 30 percent (Anwar, Blaschke, Sander 2004). Numerous immigrants escape from unemployment by establishing their own firms. Self-employment is very popular among Muslim minorities. For example, Turks are twice as likely to take up self-employment as any other minority group in Germany (Constant, Shachmurove and Zimmermann, 2007).

Members of ethnic minorities, especially those of Turkish descent, are also pushed towards the unskilled occupations; immigrants are under-represented in stable and well-paid jobs and outnumber the native Germans in unskilled and menial jobs (Kogan, 2003). These findings have led Kogan to the conclusion about the formation of an ethnic underclass in Germany. Members of alluvial minorities earn less even when they obtain a job. The research has shown that there are significant wage gaps between native Germans and immigrants. Those gaps exist also between natives in Germany and citizens with immigration background (in case of men, they are even higher for those who are naturalized than for immigrants without German citizenship) (Aldashev, Gernandt and Thomsen, 2008).

Similar patterns of socio-economic marginalization and alienation are observed within immigrant Muslim minorities in other European countries. It was explored in the comparative study of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, published in 2006. In many European Union Member States the rates of unemployment among immigrant groups in the first decade of 21st century were much higher than the average for the host society. For example, Belgian official data has shown that the unemployment rate for members of Turkish and Moroccan diaspora was 38%, while at the same time the unemployment rate in Belgium was 7%. In the United Kingdom Muslims had the highest unemployment rate (13%) and it even increased in case of Muslim women (18%). In the Netherlands, 16% of foreigners and their descendants did not have a job, while the unemployment rate in the host society oscillated between 6 and 7%. The OECD Report stated that in many European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands – there are huge differences in school performance existing between pupils from native populations and those from the immigrant background (EUMC, 2006: 45, 53).

As the figures on economic and educational marginalization show, the underachievement of Muslim minorities in these areas is the crucial problem of integration politics. The change of naturalization regime which occurred in 1990 and in 2000 can be also understood as a political attempt to reduce the sharp class divisions between majority and immigrant minorities. The symbolic inclusion of different groups into the German nation was expected to translate into the economic and educational inclusion.

Changes in citizenship and immigration law

The politics of integration practically did not exist in the first decades of presence of Muslim *Gastarbeiter* in Germany; its substitute was "Multikulti", which allowed immigrants to live their separate lives and in fact deepened their alienation. The immigrants were supposed to return to their home countries after their work contracts expire. Muslim immigrants were permitted to live as they wanted, however the extreme *laissez-faire* politics (lack of positive integration efforts) led to the complete isolation of this group and creation of "parallel universes". Muslim immigrants lived in Germany, but settled in separate poor districts and shopped in ethnic shops owned by other immigrants. Many of them did not learn to speak German. They did not participate in public life because they did not have German citizenship. They had no voting right and could not be elected as members of state bodies. The German *jus sanguinis* only allowed that children born to German parents obtained German citizenship. It has been identified with a vision of an "ethnic nation" (Brubaker, 1992) – "community of descent", restrictive towards non-German immigrants, based on common history, tradition, culture and language.

This connection of ethnic descent and citizenship became particularly controversial in the 1990s (Hailbronner, 2012). Large numbers of immigrants from Eastern Europe and Russia arrived in Germany; they and their families were entitled to privileged acquisition of German citizenship. Some of them had never been to Germany before, but they obtained a legal and social status far superior to that of "Muslim immigrants" who had lived in the country for decades.

Some changes in naturalization rules were introduced in years 1990-1993. The amendment of Citizenship Law provided for the possibility of naturalization after 15 years of residence – in case of first generation immigrants and after 8 years – in case of immigrant children born in Germany. This increased the naturalization rate; just in a year, 45,000 immigrants from the first and second generation applied for and obtained German citizenship.

A political idea which triggered the breakthrough changes in citizenship and naturalization regime was the concept of a core (leading) culture – *Leitkultur*. It was introduced by Bassam Tibi, a Muslim scientist working in Germany. Tibi stated that contemporary processes of globalization of structures (in economy, politics, transport and communication) are not necessarily followed by universalization of values in different communities. In consequence, radical fragmentation of society occurs. Tibi proposed a solution which he called a core culture formed as a connection of values (*Werte-Verbindlichkeit*) as opposed to "randomness of values" (*Wertebeliebigkeit*). The core values of the *Leitkultur* were defined as democracy, laicism, enlightenment, human rights and civil society (Tibi, 1998: 153 – 154). The term was then popularized by the Christian – Democratic member of Bundestag, Friedrich Merz. The concept of *Leitkultur* enabled the redefinition of "nation" as a community based on common democratic values, mutual respect and tolerance, rather than on blood and common ancestors.

The old citizenship regulations, implemented in 1913, were fundamentally amended in 2000 when the new citizenship legislation came into force. The reform was initiated by the leftist coalition of SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) and the Greens Party, which came to power in 1998. The project of the new citizenship law reflected a long-time policy of the Social Democrats, who attempted to pass the liberalized laws on naturalisation back in 1982 and 1989; the previous attempts were not successful because of the conservative majority in the parliament (Howard, 2008: 47). In 1999 the right side of political scene, represented by CDU-CSU (Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union), opposed the changes too. It was argued that the new law would pose a threat to the German identity, that it would induce wild waves of immigration and lead radical Muslim parties into the German parliament. Eventually, in order to win the majority support in *Bundesrat*, the government complied with some reservations of conservative critics, and limited the permissibility of dual citizenship (Ingram and Triadafilopoulos, 2010: 374-375).

The new law introduced the *jus soli* principle: since then, a child of foreign parents could acquire German citizenship on the condition that one parent had legally had her habitual residence in Germany for eight years and that he or she had a residence permit. An „optional model" of citizenship was implemented: the applicant had to choose one nationality. Dual citizenship was not accepted. The reform created an obligation for those who had dual citizenship as children to decide between the age of eighteen and twenty three which nationality to keep and which to abandon (*Optionspflicht* – art. 29 of the *Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz*). Current research has shown that in most cases (88%) the young adults opt to choose German citizenship, and they are supported by their immigrant parents in this decision. In the decision-making process, pragmatic reasoning seems to dominate. Young people choose German citizenship because they want to retain all their rights connected with the national citizenship (86,4%), as well as the rights connected with the European Union citizenship (85,3%), which is granted automatically to every citizen of the EU Member State. Less important in the option decision was the "feeling of being German" (53,3%) (Weinmann, Becher and Gostomski, 2012; Worbs, Scholz and Blicke, 2012).

The citizenship law introduced in 2000 changed the notion of nationhood in Germany. The country shifted from a traditional "jus sanguinis" model to "jus soli". This was widely perceived as a shift from an ethnic nation towards civic nation. Naturalisation process was facilitated: foreigners were entitled to naturalisation after a residence period of eight years instead of fifteen years. The applicant should "confirm his or her commitment to the free democratic constitutional system" of the Federal Republic of Germany and declare that he has never pursued or supported any activities subverting this democratic order; the applicant should have a permanent right of residence or a residence permit; he should be able to ensure his own subsistence and the subsistence of his dependents without taking advantage of the state benefits; he should give up or lose the previous citizenship; he should not have criminal record. The applicant's spouse and children could be naturalized together irrespective of whether they have been residents for 8 years.

This legislation was supplemented by the new immigration law (*Zuwanderungsgesetz*) which was introduced in 2004. The new Immigration Act put emphasis upon integration requirements, including the right to naturalization dependent upon a proof of sufficient knowledge of the German language. Citizenship applicants who completed an integration course (language course, German history and political system) obtained an additional privilege: the required time of lawful residence for naturalization has been reduced for them from eight to seven years (Hailbronner, 2012).

The citizenship law was once again amended in 2007. The change concerned the naturalization requirements - standards of knowledge of the German language were specified. New regulations envisaged obligatory provision

of German language certificate – only few exceptions were made for some special categories of immigrants. The new law also envisaged adoption of integration tests (Hailbronner, 2012).

Statistics on naturalization show that five years after the new law was introduced, its popularity is declining. Fewer immigrants obtain German citizenship. The most significant drops in the number of naturalization were registered in years 2001-2003 and 2006-2008 (Table 2). K. Hailbronner counted that the declining interest in full legal integration resulted in a decrease of acquisitions of citizenship of more than 40% between 2000 and 2011. For example in 2010, only 26 190 Turkish nationals were naturalized, 9 898 came from African countries and 26 155 from Asia (including 5227 from Iraq and 3044 from Iran) (Hailbronner, 2012).

In spite of the critical evaluation of new citizenship regime and proclaiming its failure at attracting citizenship applicants, some official data oppose the pessimistic view of unsuccessful integration. The records from different EU Member States show that the naturalization rate in Germany is much higher than in many other European countries (Table 2). Citizenship acquisitions are at similar level in Europe's biggest immigration countries: Germany, France and the United Kingdom. There is also a noticeable difference between Germany as a multicultural state and homogeneous states of Central and Eastern Europe – like Poland, Slovakia or Lithuania, where the number of naturalizations is incomparably lower. This variance is significant even if we take into account the difference in population of the respective countries. The lowering number of citizenship applications in Germany may be explained partially by the fact that most of the members of minority groups have taken advantage of the new naturalization regime in the first years after the new law was enforced. Contemporary migration to Germany does not reach the size of 1960s and 1970s migration flows, the "naturalization market" is saturated and the interest in citizenship applications is understandably smaller than 10 or 20 years ago.

In terms of political participation of Muslim Germans, available figures provide for a diversified and ambiguous picture of civic and political activity of the group. During the last decade, German activists of Turkish descent have put themselves on a map of German politics. One of the most prominent German Turkish politicians Cem Ozdemir, was a Member of European Parliament until 2009. Currently there are five German-Turkish deputies in Bundestag (including three women), who represent mostly liberal parties (the Greens, SDP, the Left party). On the other hand, there are no official quantitative data about the number of naturalized citizens voting in the federal or local elections. Nevertheless, research has been done by Meral G. Yalcin about various forms of political participation (including writing letters to politicians, participation in a public discussion, working in a political office or in a committee, writing a letter to

the media, belonging to a political party, taking part in a citizen initiative, financial donation to a political group, signing a petition, participation in a demonstration, participation in a strike) of the immigrant youth in Germany. It occurs that participation in such actions varies among different ethnic groups: the Turks seem to participate less than European minorities – Italians and Greeks. Nevertheless, highest rate of political participation occurred among immigrants who obtained German citizenship or applied for it (Yalcin 2009: 7-8). Liberal politics of naturalisation and growing number of citizenship acquisitions may thus enhance political activity of the group in other fields.

The reforms of citizenship and immigration law in Germany were a part of a more general trend in European countries: towards the modification and adaptation of naturalization rules in order to meet the needs of immigrant (most often Muslim) communities. For example, majority of the Western European countries have accepted dual citizenship with exceptions of Austria, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. Besides, states began to transform the habitually vague naturalization requirements that needed administrative interpretation into clearly defined criteria with uniform methods of assessment (Goodman, 2010: 12, 22). In France the Guigou law introduced in 1998 granted the automatic right to French citizenship to children born in France who have foreign parents. According to the amended law, they become French citizens at the age of eighteen if they still reside in France and do not refuse citizenship. The annual rate of naturalization is circa 5% of the foreign population (Bertossi, Hajjat, 2013). Also Swedish Citizenship Act was significantly amended in 2001. Sweden decided to allow dual citizenship. The principle of domicile became a significant element of naturalization law. Immigrant children were permitted to obtain Swedish citizenship in a simplified notification procedure if they did not possess any other citizenship. For other applicants, a regular procedure remained, with a requirement of a permanent residence permit or at least a certain period of residence (Bernitz, 2012). The redefinitions of nationhood incorporated in naturalization acts transformed the traditional ethnic states into multicultural open polities.

Table 2.

**Acquisitions of citizenship in selected European States
in years 2001-2008 (in thousands)**

EU country	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Belgium	62.2	46.4	33.7	34.8	31.5	31.9	36.1	x
Denmark	11.9	17.3	6.6	15.0	10.2	8.0	3.6	6.0
Germany	**180.3**	**154.5**	**140.7**	**127.2**	**117.2**	**124.6**	**113.0**	**94.5**
Spain	16.7	21.8	26.5	38.2	42.9	62.4	71.9	84.2
France	No data	No data.	139,9	168,8	154,8	147,9	132,0	137,3
Italy	No data	No data	13,4	19,1	28,7	35,3	45,5	53,7
Lithuania	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,6	0,4	0,5	0,4	0,3

EU country	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Netherlands	46,7	45,3	28,8	26,2	28,5	29,1	30,7	28,2
Poland	1,1	1,2	1,7	1,9	2,9	1,1	1,5	1,8
Slovakia	2,9	3,5	3,5	4,0	1,4	1,1	1,5	0,5
Sweden	36,4	37,8	33,2	28,9	39,6	51,2	33,6	30,5
United Kingdom	89,8	120,1	130,5	148,3	161,8	154,0	164,5	129,3
Norway	10,8	9,0	7,9	8,2	12,7	12,0	14,9	10,3
Switzerland	27,6	36,5	35,4	35,7	38,4	46,7	43,9	44,4

Source: Eurostat, *Migrants in Europe*, 2011: 76.

On the other hand, the lessening interest in naturalizations is partly connected to other processes happening in German society. The integration and membership in a community is not restricted to the civic dimension ("political integration"). The fundamental division between the community of native German and Muslim communities is no longer based on citizenship, but it is visible in other aspects. I categorize them into three dimensions (Herrman, 2012). I distinguish cultural, security and labour dimension.

1. Cultural dimension: the religion, Islam, is sometimes perceived as opposite to the European culture, especially in conservative visions where Europe is linked with the Christian heritage. Cultural differences also embrace different customs. The most controversial aspect of Muslim tradition is the position of women in Islam, often perceived as subordinated to men, and traditional visions of family governed by a husband. Other disputable aspects of Muslim culture are ritual animal slaughter, or visibility of religious symbols (such as hijab) in the public sphere.

2. Security dimension: after terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, and then in bomb attacks in London (2005), the Muslims have been seen as a threat to public safety. Fear of Islamic fundamentalism caused exacerbation of policies against immigrants. Germany sent some Muslim activists back to their countries of origin from the German territory. Such actions even strengthened the public image of a Muslim as extreme religious activists. Moreover, Germany was involved in the war in Iraq (on American side) and this enhanced the anxiety of Islamist violence.

3. Labour dimension: Muslim immigrants came to Germany in the period of economic prosperity, but did not return to their home countries when the market crisis begun. Today, they are the group of German society which is most endangered with unemployment and economic marginalization.

The interaction between these three aspects is complicated, they coexist and different modes of marginalization seem to strengthen each other, causing some kind of "cumulative marginalization". In various decades, different elements of the multidimensional marginalization played the main role. At first, cultural

dimension was emphasized: it was manifested e.g. by the discussion in 1990s about the hijab in public schools (Oestreich, 2005). In years 2001-2006 the "safety" dimension seemed the most important. However, the Muslim riots in France (and to a lesser extent in Germany) caused that the labour market dimension grabbed more attention. As a consequence of the economic meltdown in 2009, financial crisis and increasing unemployment, the labour dimension seems to be the most important division between the German majority and the Muslim minorities nowadays.

These divisions are reflected in the public opinion, which appears sceptical about the existing institutional frames of multiculturalism. The surveys of the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach have shown that the percentage of native Germans who believe that many children of immigrant descent at German public schools might cause major problems even grew – from 47% in 1997 to 67% in 2008. IFD surveys also revealed most people in the host society think that Muslims immigrants do not accept the common values and basic convictions of the German society. Only 18% of the respondents perceived Muslim immigrants as a group which shares the values of the dominant majority (Abali, 2009). A decade after the implementation of the revolutionary changes in citizenship law, Germany still seems to be a society in transition, reluctant toward multiculturalism and immigrants. The social distance between ethnic Germans and naturalized Turks apparently stems from factors other than citizenship and state allegiance.

Conclusion

The example of Germany proves that the vision of nationhood is dynamic and depends on demographic changes in the society. The reform of citizenship law in 2000 has fundamentally changed the public image of nationhood in Germany: it became more open and hospitable towards different minority groups. However, the legal notion of a cohesive nation (civic or ethnic) embodied in naturalization rules, does not equal the social cohesion, which is the main objective of integration and citizenship politics. The prevailing inequalities and divisions between host society and ethnic or religious minorities – even naturalized – are based on socio-economic factors. The citizenship and immigration did not manage to remove at once all obstacles in this area. Contrary to the change of legal status, alterations in socio-economic status of immigrant groups may require more time. However, recent studies of the Federal Ministry of Migration and Refugees prove that naturalized immigrants achieve better results and higher degrees in education.

Apart from civic (political) dimension, there are other aspects of community life where Muslim immigrants are seen as "Others". This is why the reform of citizenship and immigration law was not a sufficient change.

Redefinition of nationhood also coincided with the processes of Europeanisation and globalization. New patterns of collective identity were introduced (citizenship of the European Union), which weakened the importance of nationhood and national citizenship. The shift towards multiple identities is also manifested in the current political debate in Germany which focuses on the possibility of acceptance of dual citizenship to a larger extent.

REFERENCES

Abali, O.S. (2009). *German Public Opinion on Immigration and Integration*, Institut fur Demoskopie Allensbach.

Aldashev, A., Gernandt, J., Thomsen, S. (2008). *The Immigrant Wage Gap in Germany*, *www.eale.nl* (01/05/2013).

Anwar, M., Blaschke, J., Sander, A. (2004). *State Policies Towards Muslim Minorities. Sweden, Great Britain and Germany*, Verlagsabteilung im Europäischen Migrationszentrum (EMZ), pp. 122-123.

Bernitz, H. (2013). *Country Report – Sweden*, EUDO Citizenship Observatory.

Bertossi, C. and Hajjat, A. (2012). *Report on France*, EUDO Citizenship Observatory.

Brubaker, R. (1992). *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Brubaker, R. (1990). *Introduction to 'Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany'*, PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, *http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/brubaker/* (01/05/2013).

Constant, A.F., Shachmurove, Y., Zimmermann, K. (2007). What Makes an Entrepreneur and Does It Pay? Native Men, Turks, and Other Migrants in Germany, *International Migration*, 45 (4): 69-98.

European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2006). *Muslims in the European Union. Discrimination and Islamophobia*, Vienna: EUMC.

EUROSTAT – European Commission (2011). *Migrants in Europe. A statistical portrait of the first and second generation*, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.

Goodman, S.W. (2010). *Naturalisation Policies in Europe: Exploring Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion,* EUDO Citizenship Observatory.

Hailbronner, K. (2012). *Report on Germany*, EUDO Citizenship Observatory.

Haug, S., Mussig, S., Stichs, A. (2009). *Muslim Life in Germany A study conducted on behalf of the German Conference on Islam*, Federal Office for Migration and Refugees.

Richard, H. (2012). *How a Constellation of Ideas Can Cause Conflict*, paper presented at a conference *Nationalism and Conflict: Interdisciplinary Methodological Approaches*, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, December 10 – 15, 2012.

Howard, M.M. (2008). The Causes and Consequences of Germany's New Citizenship Law. *German Politics*, 17(1): 41-62.

Ingram, J.D., Triadafilopoulos, T. (2010). Rights, Norms and Politics: the case of German Citizenship reform. *Social Research*, 77(1): 353-382.

Joppke, C. (1999). How immigration is changing citizenship: a comparative view. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 22(4): 629–652.

Kogan, I. (2003). *A Study of Employment Careers of Immigrants in Germany*. Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, Paper No. 66.

Kolb, H. (2008). *Immigration into a Non-immigration Country: The German Experience,* Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Information Series.

Magnette, P. (2005). *Citizenship: the history of an idea*. ECPR Press 2005.

Nalborczyk, A.S., (2005). *Muzułmanie w Niemczech – wielka społeczność religijna nieuznana przez państwo [Muslism in Germany]*. In A. Parzymies (ed.): *Muzułmanie w Europie [Muslims in Europe]*. Warsaw: Dialog.

OECD (2003). *Where immigrant students succeed - A comparative review of performance and engagement in PISA 2003*, Programme for International Student Assessment – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Oestreich, H. (2005). *Der Kopftuch-streit. Das Abendland und ein Quadrameter Islam*, Frankfurt am Main: Brandes & Apsel Verlag.

Parzymies, A. (ed.) (2005). *Muzułmanie w Europie [Muslism in Europe]*, Warsaw: Dialog.

Pędziwiatr, K. (2005). *Od islamu imigrantów do islamu obywateli: muzułmanie w krajach Europy Zachodniej. [From Islam Immigrants to Islam Citizens. Muslims in Western Europe].* Kraków: Nomos.

Sassen, S. (2002). The Repositioning of Citizenship: Emergent Subjects and Spaces for Politics. *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, 46: 4–24.

Seebaß, K., Siegert, M. (2011). *Migranten am Arbeitsmarkt in Deutschland*, Bundesamt fuer Migration und Fluchtlinge, Working Paper 36.

Soysal, Y.N. (1995). *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Soysal, Y. (1997). *Rights, identity and claims-making*, Metropolis. International Workshop Proceedings, Lisbon, pp. 1-2, *www.unitar.org* (01/05/2013).

Tibi, B. (2002). *Europa ohne Identitaet? Leitkultur oder Wertebeliebigkeit*. Munchen: Bertelsmann Verlag.

Weinmann, M., Becher, I., Babka von Gostomski, C. (2012). *The naturalisation behaviour of foreigners in Germany, and findings concerning Optionspflichtige (persons required to choose between two nationalities). Results of the 2011 BAMF Naturalisation Study*. Federal Office of Migration and Refugees.

Woellert, F., Kröhnert, S. Klingholz, R. (2009). *Ungenutzte Potenziale. Zur Lage der Integration in Deutschland*, Berlin Institut fuer Bevoelkerung und Entwicklung.

Worbs, S., Scholz, A., Blicke, S. (2012). *The option scheme in German citizenship law from the perspective of those affected by it. Results of the qualitative study concerning the option scheme*, Federal Office of Migration and Refugees.

Yalcin, M.G. (2009). *The effects of citizenship status on political participation in the case of young immigrants living in Germany*, 2009, available at: *http://youth-partnership-eu.coe.int/youthpartnership/documents/EKCYP/Youth_Policy/docs/Citizenship/Research/10_The_effects_of_citizenship_status_on_political_participx.pdf* (01/05/2013).